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Abstract
We consider the problem of fitting a linear model to data held by individuals who are concerned about their privacy.
Incentivizing most players to truthfully report their data to the analyst constrains our design to mechanisms that
provide a privacy guarantee to the participants; we use differential privacy to model individuals’ privacy losses. This
immediately poses a problem, as differentially private computation of a linear model necessarily produces a biased
estimation, and existing approaches to design mechanisms to elicit data from privacy-sensitive individuals do not
generalize well to biased estimators. We overcome this challenge through an appropriate design of the computation
and payment scheme.
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1 Introduction
Fitting a linear model is perhaps the most fundamental and basic learning task, with diverse applications from statistics
to experimental sciences like medicine and sociology. In many settings, the data from which a model is to be learnt
are not held by the analyst performing the regression task, but must be elicited from individuals. Such settings clearly
include medical trials and census surveys, as well as mining online behavioral data, a practice currently happening at
a massive scale.
If data are held by self-interested individuals, it is not enough to simply run a regression—the data holders may
wish to influence the outcome of the computation, either because they could benefit directly from certain outcomes, or
to mask their input due to privacy concerns. In this case, it is necessary to model the utility functions of the individuals
and to design mechanisms that provide proper incentives. Ideally, such mechanisms should still allow for accurate
computation of the underlying regression. A tradeoff then emerges between the accuracy of the computation and the
budget required to compensate participants.
In this paper, we focus on the problem posed by data holders who are concerned with their privacy. Our approach
can easily be generalized to handle individuals manipulating the computation’s outcome for other reasons, but for
clarity we treat only privacy concerns. We consider a population of players, each holding private data, and an analyst
who wishes to compute a linear model from their data. The analyst must design a mechanism (a computation he
will do and payments he will give the players) that incentivizes the players to provide information that will allow for
accurate computation, while minimizing the payments the analyst must make.
We use a model of players’ costs for privacy that is based on the well-established notion of differential privacy [9].
Incentivizing most players to truthfully report their data to the analyst constrains our design to mechanisms that are
differentially private. This immediately poses a problem, as differentially private computation of a linear model
necessarily produces a biased estimation; existing approaches [12] to design mechanisms to elicit data from privacy-
sensitive individuals do not generalize well to biased estimators. Overcoming this challenge, through appropriate
design of the computation and payment scheme, is the main technical contribution of the present work.
1.1 Our Results
We study the above issues in the context of linear regression. We present a mechanism (Algorithm 2), which, under
appropriate choice of parameters and fairly mild technical assumptions, satisfies the following properties: it is (a)
accurate (Theorem 4), i.e., computes an estimator whose squared L2 distance to the true linear model goes to zero
as the number of individuals increases, (b) asymptotically truthful (Theorem 3), in that agents have no incentive to
misreport their data, (c) it incentivizes participation (Theorem 5), as players receive positive utility, and (d) it requires
an asymptotically small budget (Theorem 6), as total payments to agents go to zero as the number of individuals
increases. Our technical assumptions are on how individuals experience privacy losses and on the distribution from
which these losses are drawn. Accuracy of the computation is attained by establishing that the algorithm provides dif-
ferential privacy (Theorem 2), and that it provides payments such that the vast majority of individuals are incentivized
to participate and to report truthfully (Theorems 3 and 5). An informal statement appears in Theorem 1.
The fact that our total budget decreases in the number of individuals in the population is an effect of the approach
we use to eliciting truthful participation, which is based on the peer prediction technology (Appendix A.1) and of the
model of agents’ costs for privacy (Section 2.4). A similar effect was seen by [12]. As they note, costs would no
longer tend to zero if our model incorporated some fixed cost for interacting with each individual.
1.2 Related Work
Following [13], a series of papers have studied data acquisition problems from agents that have privacy concerns. The
vast majority of this work [11, 19, 23, 7] operates in a model where agents cannot lie about their private information
(their only recourse is to withhold it or perhaps to lie about their costs for privacy). A related thread [13, 22, 6] explores
cost models based on the notion of differential privacy [9].
Our setting is closest to, and inspired by, [12], who bring the technology of peer prediction to bear on the problem
of incentivizing truthful reporting in the presence of privacy concerns. The peer prediction approach of [21] incen-
tivizes truthful reporting (in the absence of privacy constraints) by rewarding players for reporting information that is
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predictive of the reports of other agents. This allows the analyst to leverage correlations between players’ information.
[12] adapt the peer prediction approach to overcome a number of challenges presented by privacy-sensitive individu-
als. The mechanism and analysis of [12] was for the simplest possible statistic—the sum of private binary types. In
contrast, we regress a linear model over player data, a significantly more sophisticated learning task. In particular, to
attain accurate, privacy-preserving linear regression, we deal with biased private estimators, which interferes with our
ability to incentivize truth-telling, and hence to compute an accurate statistic.
Linear regression under strategic agents has been studied in a variety of different contexts. [8] consider an analyst
that regresses a “consensus” model across data coming from multiple strategic agents; agents would like the consensus
value to minimize a loss over their own data, and they show that, in this setting, empirical risk minimization is group-
strategyproof. A similar result, albeit in a more restricted setting, is established by [24]. Regressing a linear model
over data from strategic agents that can only manipulate their costs, but not their data, was studied by [14] and [4],
while [16] consider a setting without payments, in which agents receive a utility as a function of estimation accuracy.
We depart from the above approaches by considering agents whose utilities depend on their loss of privacy, an aspect
absent from the above works.
Finally, we note a growing body of work on differentially private empirical risk minimization. Our mechanism is
based on the outcome perturbation algorithm of [5]. Other algorithms from this literature — such as the localization
algorithm of [1] or objective perturbation of [5] — could be used instead, and would likely yield even better accuracy
guarantees. We chose the output perturbation mechanism because it provides an explicit characterization of the noise
added to preserve privacy, which allows the analysis to better highlight the challenges of incorporating privacy into
our setting.
2 Model and Preliminaries
We present our model and a technical preliminary in this section. A more detailed review of peer prediction, linear
regression, and differential privacy can be found in Appendix A.
2.1 A Regression Setting
We consider a population where each player i ∈ [n] ≡ {1, . . . , n} is associated with a vector xi ∈ Rd (i.e., player
i’s features) and a variable yi ∈ R (i.e., her response variable). We assume that responses are linearly related to the
features; that is, there exists a θ ∈ Rd such that
yi = θ
⊤xi + zi, for all i ∈ [n], (1)
where zi are zero-mean noise variables.
An analyst wishes to infer a linear model from the players’ data; that is, he wishes to estimate θ, e.g., by performing
linear regression on the players’ data. However, players incur a privacy cost from revelation of their data and need to
be properly incentivized to truthfully reveal it to the analyst. More specifically, as in [16], we assume that player i can
manipulate her responses yi but not her features xi. This is indeed the case when features are measured directly by the
analyst (e.g., are observed during a physical examination or are measured in a lab) or are verifiable (e.g., features are
extracted from a player’s medical record or are listed on her ID). A player may misreport her response yi, on the other
hand, which is unverifiable; this would be the case if, e.g., yi is the answer the player gives to a survey question about
her preferences or habits.
We assume that players are strategic and may lie either to increase the payment they extract from the analyst or to
mitigate any privacy violation they incur by the disclosure of their data. To address such strategic behavior, the analyst
will design a mechanism M : (Rd × R)n → Rd × Rn+ that takes as input all player data (namely, the features xi
and possibly perturbed responses yˆi), and outputs an estimate θˆ and a set of non-negative payments {πi}i∈[n] to each
player. Informally, we seek mechanisms that allow for accurate estimation of θ while requiring only asymptotically
small budget. In order to ensure accurate estimation of θ, we will require that our mechanism incentivizes truthful
participation on the part of most players, which in turn will require that we provide an appropriate privacy guarantee.
We discuss privacy in more detail in Section 2.3. Clearly, all of the above also depend on the players’ rational behavior
and, in particular, their utilities; we formally present our model of player utilities in Section 2.4.
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Throughout our analysis, we assume that θ is drawn independently from a known distribution F , the attribute
vectors xi are drawn independently from the uniform distribution on the d-dimensional unit ball,1 and the noise
terms zi are drawn independently from a known distribution G. Thus θ, {xi}i∈[n], and {zi}i∈[n] are independent
random variables, while responses {yi}i∈[n] are determined by (1). Note that as a result, responses are conditionally
independent given θ.
We require some additional bounded support assumptions on these distributions. In short, these boundedness
assumptions are needed to ensure the sensitivity of mechanism M is finite; it is also natural in practice that both
features and responses take values in a bounded domain. More precisely, we assume that the distribution F has
bounded support, such that ‖θ‖22 ≤ B for some constant B; we also require the noise distribution G to have mean zero,
finite variance σ2, and bounded support: supp(G) = [−M,M ] for some constant M . These assumptions together
imply that
∣∣θ⊤xi∣∣ ≤ B and |yi| ≤ B +M .
2.2 Linear and Ridge Regression
Let X = [xi]i∈[n] ∈ Rn×d denote the n × d matrix of features, and y = [yi]i∈[n] ∈ Rn the vector of responses.
Estimating θ through ridge regression amounts to minimizing the following regularized quadratic loss function:
L(θ;X, y) =
n∑
i=1
ℓ(θ;xi, yi) =
n∑
i=1
(yi − θ⊤xi)2 + γ ‖θ‖22 . (2)
That is, the ridge regression estimator can be written as: θˆR = argminθ∈Rd L(θ;X, y) = (γI + X⊤X)−1X⊤y.
The parameter γ > 0, known as the regularization parameter, ensures that the loss function is strongly convex (see
Appendix E) and, in particular, that the minimizer of (2) is unique. When γ = 0, the estimator is the standard linear
regression estimator, which we denote by θˆL = (X⊤X)−1X⊤y. The linear regression estimator is unbiased, i.e.,
under (1), it satisfies E[θˆL] = θ. The same is not true when γ > 0; the general ridge regression estimator θˆR is biased.
2.3 Differential Privacy
Recall the classic definition of differential privacy by [9]:
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [9]). A mechanism M : Dn → R is ǫ-differentially private if for every pair of
databases D,D′ ∈ Dn differing only in one element, and for every subset of possible outputs S ⊆ R, Pr[M(D) ∈
S] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr[M(D′) ∈ S].
We depart from this classic definition, quantifying privacy violation instead through joint differential privacy [17].
Intuitively, full differential privacy requires that all outputs by the mechanism M, including the payment it allocates
to a player, is insensitive to every player’s input. In settings like ours, however, it makes sense to assume that the
payment to a player is also in some sense “private,” in that it is shared neither publicly nor with other players. To that
end, we assume that the estimate θˆ computed by the mechanism M is a publicly observable output; in contrast, each
payment πi is observable only by player i. Hence, from the perspective of each player i, the mechanism output that is
publicly released and that, in turn, might violate her privacy, is (θˆ, π−i), where π−i comprises all payments excluding
player i’s payment.
Definition 2 (Joint Differential Privacy [17]). Consider a mechanism M : Dn → O × Rn, for D,O,R arbitrary
sets. For each i ∈ [n], let (M(·))−i = (o, π−i) ∈ O × Rn−1 denote the portion of the mechanism’s output that
is observable to outside observers and players j 6= i. A mechanism M is ǫ-jointly differentially private if, for every
player i, every database D ∈ Dn, every d′i ∈ D, and for every observable set of outcomes S ⊆ O ×Rn−1:
Pr
[
(M(D))−i ∈ S
] ≤ exp(ǫ) Pr [(M(d′i, D−i))−i ∈ S] .
1See Theorem 7 and its accompanying Remark in Appendix A.2 for a discussion of generalizing beyond the uniform distribution.
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This relaxation of differential privacy is natural, but it is also necessary to incentivize truthfulness. Requiring that
a player’s payment πi be ǫ-differentially private implies that a player’s unilateral deviation changes the distribution of
her payment only slightly. Hence, under full differential privacy, a player’s payment would remain roughly the same
no matter what she reports, which intuitively cannot incentivize truthful reporting.
We emphasize here that the existence of priors and the independence of responses are used only to prove the
accuracy of the model learned and truthfulness, but not to ensure any privacy guarantee. Our mechanism satisfies
joint differential privacy regardless of of whether the assumptions hold; if they do, accuracy and truthfulness follow.
Further, the notion of ǫ-joint differential privacy depends on both yi and xi: although a player can only manipulate yi,
both her response and her features are treated as “private” variables in our model, and both disclosures incur a privacy
cost. Features should certainly be deemed private if, e.g., they are attributes in a player’s medical record, or outcomes
of a medical examination. Moreover, (1) implies a correlation between features and the response, which can be strong,
for example, in the case where θ has small support; it is therefore reasonable to assume that, if the response is private,
so should features correlated to this response.
2.4 Player Utilities
As discussed in the related work section, starting from [13], a series of recent papers on strategic data revelation
model player privacy costs as functions of the privacy parameter ǫ. We also adopt this modeling assumption. Having
introduced the notion of joint differential privacy, we now present our model of player utilities. We assume that every
player is characterized by a cost parameter ci ∈ R+, determining her sensitivity to the privacy violation incurred by
the revelation of her data to her analyst. In particular, each player has a privacy cost function fi(ci, ǫ) that describes
the cost she incurs when her data is used in an ǫ-jointly differentially private computation. Players have quasilinear
utilities, so if player i receives payment πi for her report, and experiences cost fi(ci, ǫ) from her privacy loss, her
utility is ui = πi − fi(ci, ǫ).
Following again recent work, we assume that fi can be an arbitrary function, bounded by an increasing monomial
of ǫ. In particular, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The privacy cost function of each player satisfies fi(ci, ǫ) ≤ ciǫ2.
The monotonicity in ǫ is intuitive, as smaller values imply stronger privacy properties, with ǫ = 0 indicating the
output is independent of player i’s data. We note that the quadratic bound in Assumption 1 was introduced by [6] and
also adopted by [12]. As noted by the above authors, the quadratic bound can be shown to hold for a broad class of
natural cost functions fi; we refer the reader to Appendix D for a formal description of this class.
Throughout our analysis, we assume that the privacy cost parameters are also random variables, sampled from a
distribution C. We allow ci to depend on player i’s data (xi, yi); however, we assume conditioned on (xi, yi), that ci
does not reveal any additional information about the costs or data of any other agents. Formally:
Assumption 2. Given (xi, yi), (X−i, y−i, c−i) is conditionally independent of ci:
Pr[(X−i, y−i, c−i)|(xi, yi), ci] = Pr[(X−i, y−i, c−i)|(xi, yi), c′i] for all (X−i, y−i, c−i), (xi, yi), ci, c′i.
We also make the following additional technical assumption on the tail of C.
Assumption 3. The conditional marginal distribution satisfies minxi,yi
(
Prcj∼C|xi,yi [cj ≤ τ ]
) ≥ 1 − τ−p for some
constant p > 1.
Note that Assumption 3 implies that Prci∼C [ci ≤ τ ] ≥ 1− τ−p.
2.5 Mechanism Properties
We seek mechanisms that satisfy the following properties: (a) truthful reporting is an equilibrium, (b) the estimator
computed under truthful reporting is highly accurate, (c) players are ensured non-negative utilities from truthful re-
porting, and (d) the budget required from the analyst to run the mechanism is small. We present here the standard
definitions for these properties used in this paper. Consider a regression mechanism M. Let πi(X, y) and be the
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Algorithm 1 Truthful Regression Mechanism(a, b)
Solicit reports X ∈ (Rd)n and yˆ ∈ Rn
Analyst computes θˆL = (X⊤X)−1X⊤yˆ and θˆL−i = (X⊤−iX−i)−1X⊤−iyˆ−i for each i ∈ [n]
Output estimator θˆL
Pay each player i, πi = Ba,b(x⊤i θˆL−i, x⊤i E[θ|xi, yˆi])
payment to player i when (X, y) is the collection of reports to the regression mechanism, and let fi(ci, ǫ) be player i’s
cost for participating in the mechanism. We define a strategy profile σ = (σ1, . . . , σn) to be a collection of strategies
σi (one for each player), mapping from realized data (xi, yi) to reports yˆi. Under strategy σi, a player who has data
(xi, yi) would report yˆi = σi(xi, yi) to the regression mechanism.
Definition 3 (Bayes Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile σ forms an η-approximate Bayes Nash equilibrium if for
every player i, for all realizable (xi, yi), and for every misreport yˆi 6= yi,
E[πi(X, σ(X, y))]− fi(ci, ǫ) ≥ E[πi(X, (yˆi, σ−i(X−i, y−i)))]− f(ci, ǫ)− η.
Definition 4 (Accuracy). A regression is η-accurate if for all realizable parameters θ, it outputs an estimate θˆ such
that E[‖θˆ − θ‖22] ≤ η.
Definition 5 (Individually Rational). A mechanism is individually rational (IR) if E[πi(X, y)] − fi(ci, ǫ) ≥ 0 for
every player i and for all realizable (X, y).
We will also be concerned with the total amount spent by the analyst in the mechanism. The budget B of a
mechanism is the sum of all payments made to players. That is, B =∑i πi.
Definition 6 (Asymptotically small budget). An asymptotically small budget is such that B =∑ni=1 πi(X, y) = o(1),
for all realizable (X, y).
3 Truthful Regression without Privacy Constraints
To illustrate the ideas we use in the rest of the paper, we present in this section a mechanism which incentivizes truthful
reporting in the absence of privacy concerns. If the players do not have privacy concerns (i.e., ci = 0 for all i ∈ [n]),
the analyst can simply collect data, estimate θ using linear regression, and compensate players using the following
scoring rule:2
Ba,b(p, q) = a− b
(
p− 2pq + q2) .
The mechanism is formally presented in Algorithm 1. In the spirit of peer prediction, a player’s payment depends on
how well her reported yˆi agrees with the predicted value of yi, as constructed by the estimate θˆL−i of θ produced by all
her peers. We now show that truthful reporting is a Bayes Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1 (Truthfulness). For all a, b > 0, truthful reporting is a Bayes Nash equilibrium under Algorithm 1.
Proof. Recall that conditioned on xi, yi, the distribution of X−i, y−i is independent of ci. Hence, assuming all other
players are truthful, player i’s expected payment conditioned on her data (xi, yi) and her cost ci, for reporting yˆi is,
E[πi|xi, yi, ci] = E
[
Ba,b(x
⊤
i θˆ
L
−i, x
⊤
i E[θ|xi, yˆi])|xi, yi
]
= Ba,b
(
x⊤i E[θˆ
L
−i|xi, yi], x⊤i E[θ|xi, yˆi]
)
.
The second inequality is due to the linearity of Ba,b in its first argument, as well as the linearity of the inner product.
Note that Ba,b is uniquely maximized by reporting yˆi such that E[θ|xi, yˆi]⊤xi = E[θˆL−i|xi, yi]⊤xi. Since θˆL is an
unbiased estimator of θ, then E[θˆL−i|xi, yi] = E[θ|xi, yi]. Thus the optimal misreport is yˆi such that E[θ|xi, yˆi]⊤xi =
E[θ|xi, yi]⊤xi, so truthful reporting is a Bayes Nash equilibrium.
2This is a variant of the well-known Brier scoring rule [3]. See Appendix A.1 for more details.
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We note that truthfulness is essentially a consequence of (1) the fact that Ba,b is a strictly proper scoring rule (as
it is positive-affine in its first argument and strictly concave in its second argument), and (2) most importantly, the
fact that θˆL−i is an unbiased estimator of θ. Moreover, as in the case of the simple peer prediction setting presented in
Appendix A.1, truthfulness persists even if θˆL−i in Algorithm 1 is replaced by a linear regression estimator constructed
over responses restricted to an arbitrary set S ⊆ [n] \ i.
Truthful reports enable accurate computation of the estimator with high probability, with accuracy parameter
η = O( 1n ).
Lemma 2 (Accuracy). Under truthful reporting, with probability at least 1−d−t2 and when n ≥ C( tξ )2(d+2) log d,
the accuracy the estimator θˆL in Algorithm 1 is E
[∥∥∥θˆL − θ∥∥∥2
2
]
≤ σ2
(1−ξ) 1
d+2n
.
Proof. Note that E
[∥∥∥θˆL − θ∥∥∥2
2
]
= trace(Cov(θˆL))
(5)
= σ2 trace
(
(X⊤X)−1
)
. For i.i.d. features xi, the spectrum
of matrix X⊤X can be asymptotically characterized by a theorem of [25] (see Theorem 7 in Appendix A.2), and the
lemma follows.
Remark Note that individual rationality and a small budget can be trivially attained in the absence of privacy costs.
To ensure individual rationality of Algorithm 1, payments πi must be non-negative, but can be made arbitrarily small.
Thus payments can be scaled down to reduce the analyst’s total budget. For example, setting a = b(B + 2B(B +
M) + (B +M)2 − 1) and b = 1n2 ensures πi ≥ 0 for all players i, and the total required budget is 1n (2B + 4B(B +
M) + (B +M)2) = O( 1n ).
4 Truthful Regression with Privacy Constraints
As we saw in the previous section, in the absence of privacy concerns, it is possible to devise payments that incentivize
truthful reporting. These payments compensate players based on how well their report agrees with a response predicted
by θˆL estimated using other player’s reports.
Players whose utilities depend on privacy raise several challenges. Recall that the parameters estimated by the
analyst, and the payments made to players, need to satisfy joint differential privacy, and hence any estimate of θ
revealed publicly by the analyst or used in a payment must be ǫ-differentially private. Unfortunately, the sensitivity of
the linear regression estimator θˆL to changes in the input data is, in general, unbounded. As a result, it is not possible
to construct a non-trivial differentially private version of θˆL by, e.g., adding noise to its output.
In contrast, differentially private versions of regularized estimators like the ridge regression estimator θˆR can be
constructed. Recent techniques have been developed for precisely this purpose, not only for ridge regression but for
the broader class of learning through (convex) empirical risk minimization [5, 1]. In short, the techniques by [5] and
[1] succeed precisely because, for γ > 0, the regularized loss (2) is strongly convex. This implies that the sensitivity
of θˆR is bounded, and a differentially private version of θˆR can be constructed by adding noise of appropriate variance
or though alternative techniques such as objective perturbation.
The above suggest that a possible approach to constructing a truthful, accurate mechanism in the presence of
privacy-conscious players is to modify Algorithm 1 by replacing θˆL with a ridge regression estimator θˆR, both with
respect to the estimate released globally and to any estimates used in computing payments. Unfortunately, such an
approach breaks truthfulness because θˆR is a biased estimator. The linear regression estimator θˆL ensured that the
scoring rule Ba,b was maximized precisely when players reported their response variable truthfully. However, in the
presence of an expected bias b, it can easily be seen that the optimal report of player i deviates from truthful reporting
by a quantity proportional to bTxi.
We address this issue for large n using again the concentration result by [25] (see Appendix A.2). This ensures
that for large n, the spectrum of X⊤X should grow roughly linearly with n, with high probability. By (5), this implies
that as long as γ grows more slowly than n, the bias term of θˆR converges to zero, with high probability. Together,
these statements ensure that for an appropriate choice of γ, we attain approximate truthfulness for large n, while also
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ensuring that the output of our mechanism remains differentially private for all n. We formalize this intuition by prov-
ing that our mechanism presented in Section 4.1, based on ridge regression, indeed attains approximate truthfulness
for large n, while also remaining jointly differentially private.
4.1 Private Regression Mechanism
We present our mechanism for private and truthful regression in Algorithm 2, which is a privatized version of Algo-
rithm 1. We incorporate into our mechanism the Output Perturbation algorithm from [5], which first computes the
ridge regression estimator and then adds noise to the output. This approach is used to ensure that the mechanism’s
output satisfies joint differential privacy.
The noise vector v will be drawn according to the following distribution PL, which is a high-dimensional Laplace
distribution with parameter 4B+2Mγǫ : PL(v) ∝ exp
(
−γǫ
4B+2M ‖v‖2
)
.
Algorithm 2 Private Regression Mechanism(γ, ǫ, a, b)
Solicit reports X ∈ (Rd)n and yˆ ∈ Rn
Randomly partition players into two groups, with respective data pairs (X0, yˆ0) and (X1, yˆ1)
Analyst computes θˆR = (γI +X⊤X)−1X⊤yˆ and θˆRj = (γI +X⊤j Xj)−1X⊤j yˆj for j = 0, 1
Independently draw v, v0, v1 ∈ Rd according to distribution PL
Compute estimators θˆP = θˆR + v, θˆP0 = θˆR0 + v0, and θˆP1 = θˆR1 + v1
Output estimator θˆP
Pay each player i in group j, πi = Ba,b((θˆP1−j)⊤xi,E[θ|xi, yˆi]⊤xi) for j = 0, 1
Here we state an informal version of our main result. The formal version of this result is stated in Corollary 1,
which aggregates and instantiates Theorems 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.
Theorem 1 (Main result (Informal)). Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, there exists ways to set γ, ǫ, a, and b in Algorithm
2 to ensure that with high probability:
1. the output of Algorithm 2 is o( 1√
n
)-jointly differentially private,
2. it is an o
(
1
n
)
-approximate Bayes Nash equilibrium for a (1− o(1))-fraction of players to truthfully report their
data,
3. the computed estimator θˆP is o(1)-accurate,
4. it is individually rational for a (1− o(1))-fraction of players to participate in the mechanism, and
5. the required budget from the analyst is o(1).
5 Analysis of Algorithm 2
In this section, we flesh out the claims made in Theorem 1. Due to space constraints, all proofs are deferred to
Appendix B.
Theorem 2 (Privacy). The mechanism in Algorithm 2 is 2ǫ-jointly differentially private.
Proof idea We first show that the estimators θˆP , θˆP0 , θˆP1 together satisfy 2ǫ-differential privacy, by bounding the
maximum amount that any player’s report can affect the estimators. We then use the Billboard Lemma (Lemma 5 in
Appendix A.3) to show that the estimators, together with the vector of payments, satisfy 2ǫ-joint differential privacy.
Once we have a privacy guarantee, we can build on this to get truthful participation and hence accuracy. To do so,
we first show that a symmetric threshold strategy equilibrium exists, in which all agents with cost parameter ci below
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some threshold τ should participate and truthfully report their yi. We define τα,β to be the cost threshold such that (1)
with probability 1 − β (with respect to the prior from which costs are drawn), at least a (1 − α)-fraction of players
have cost parameter ci ≤ τα,β , and (2) conditioned on her own data, each player i believes that with probability 1−α,
any other player j will have cost parameter cj ≤ τα,β .
Definition 7 (Threshold τα,β). Fix a marginal cost distribution C on {ci}, and let
τ1α,β = infτ
(
Pr
c∼C
[|{i : ci ≤ τ}| ≥ (1 − α)n] ≥ 1− β
)
,
τ2α = infτ
(
min
xi,yi
(
Pr
cj∼C|xi,yi
[cj ≤ τ ]
)
≥ 1− α
)
.
Define τα,β to be the larger of these thresholds: τα,β = max{τ1α,β , τ2α}.
We also define the threshold strategy στ , in which a player reports truthfully if her cost ci is below τ , and is allowed
to misreport arbitrarily if her cost is above τ .
Definition 8 (Threshold strategy). Define the threshold strategy στ as follows:
στ (xi, yi, ci) =
{
Report yˆi = yi if ci ≤ τ,
Report arbitrary yˆi otherwise.
We show that στα,β forms a symmetric threshold strategy equilibrium in the Private Regression Mechanism of
Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3 (Truthfulness). Fix a participation goal 1− α, a privacy parameter ǫ, a desired confidence parameter β,
ξ ∈ (0, 1), and t ≥ 1. Then under Assumptions 1 and 2, with probability 1 − dt2 and when n ≥ C( tξ )2(d+ 2) log d,
the symmetric threshold strategy στα,β is an η-approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium in Algorithm 2 for
η = b
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
)2
+ τα,βǫ
2.
Proof idea There are three primary sources of error which cause the estimator θˆP to differ from a player’s posterior
on θ. First, ridge regression is a biased estimation technique; second, Algorithm 2 adds noise to preserve privacy;
third, players with cost parameter ci above threshold τα,β are allowed to misreport their data. We show how to control
the effects of these three sources of error, so that θˆP is “not too far” from a player’s posterior on θ. Finally, we use
strong convexity of the payment rule to show that any player’s payment from misreporting is at most η greater than
from truthful reporting.
Theorem 4 (Accuracy). Fix a participation goal 1 − α, a privacy parameter ǫ, a desired confidence parameter β,
ξ ∈ (0, 1), and t ≥ 1. Then under the symmetric threshold strategy στα,β , Algorithm 2 will output an estimator θˆP
such that with probability at least 1− β − d−t2 , and when n ≥ C( tξ )2(d+ 2) log d,
E[‖θˆP − θ‖22] = O
((
αn
γ
+
1
γǫ
)2
+
(γ
n
)2
+
(
1
n
)2
+
αn
γ
+
1
γǫ
)
.
Proof idea As in Theorem 3, we control the three sources of error in the estimator θˆP — the bias of ridge regression,
the noise added to preserve privacy, and the error due to some players misreporting their data — this time measuring
distance with respect to the expected L2 norm difference.
We next see that players whose cost parameters are below the threshold τα,β are incentivized to participate.
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Theorem 5 (Individual Rationality). Under Assumption 1, the mechanism in Algorithm 2 is individually rational for
all players with cost parameters ci ≤ τα,β as long as,
a ≥
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
+B
)
(b+ 2bB) + bB2 + τα,βǫ
2,
regardless of the reports from players with cost coefficients above τα,β .
Proof idea A player’s utility from participating in the mechanism is her payment minus her privacy cost. The
parameter a in the payment rule is a constant offset that shifts each player’s payment. We lower bound the minimum
payment from Algorithm 2 and upper bound the privacy cost of any player with cost coefficient below threshold τα,β .
If a is larger than the difference between these two terms, then any player with cost coefficient below threshold will
receive non-negative utility.
Finally, we analyze the total cost to the analyst for running the mechanism.
Theorem 6 (Budget). The total budget required by the analyst to run Algorithm 2 when players utilize threshold
equilibrium strategy στα,β is
B ≤ n
[
a+
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
+B
)
(b+ 2bB)
]
.
Proof idea The analyst’s budget is the sum of all payments made to players in the mechanism. We upper bound the
maximum payment to any player, and the total budget required is at most n times this maximum payment.
5.1 Formal Statement of Main Result
In this section, we present our main result, Corollary 1, which instantiates Theorems 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 with a setting of
all parameters to get the bounds promised in Theorem 1. Before stating our main result, we first require the following
lemma which asymptotically bounds τα,β for an arbitrary bounded distribution. We use this to control the asymptotic
behavior of τα,β under Assumption 3.
Lemma 3. For a cost distribution C with conditional marginal CDF lower bounded by some function F :
min
xi,yi
(
Pr
cj∼C|xi,yi
[cj ≤ τ ]
)
≥ F (τ),
then
τα,β ≤ max{F−1(1− αβ), F−1(1− α)}.
We note that under Assumption 3, Lemma 3 implies that τα,β ≤ max{(αβ)−1/p, (α)−1/p}. Using this fact, we
can state a formal version of our main result.
Corollary 1 (Main result (Formal)). Choose δ ∈ (0, p2+2p ). Then under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, setting γ = n1−
δ
2 ,
ǫ = n−1+δ, a = (6B + 2M)(1 + B)2n−
3
2 + n−
3
2+δ , and b = n− 32 in Algorithm 2, and taking α = n−δ, β =
n−
p
2+δ(1+p), ξ = 1/2, and t =
√
n
4C(d+2) log d , ensures that with probability 1− dΘ(−n) − n−
p
2+δ(1+p):
1. the output of Algorithm 2 is O (n−1+δ)-jointly differentially private,
2. it is an O
(
n−
3
2+δ
)
-approximate Bayes Nash equilibrium for a 1 − O (n−δ) fraction of players to truthfully
report their data,
3. the computed estimate θˆP is O
(
n−δ
)
-accurate,
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4. it is individually rational for a 1−O (n−δ) fraction of players to participate in the mechanism, and
5. the required budget from the analyst is O
(
n−
1
2+δ
)
.
This follows from instantiating Theorems 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 with the specified parameters. Note that the choice of δ
controls the trade-off between approximation factors for the desired properties.
Remark Note that different settings of parameters can be used to yield a different trade-off between approximation
factors in the above result. For example, if the analyst is willing to supply a higher budget (say constant or increasing
with n), he could improve on the accuracy guarantee.
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A Technical Preliminaries
A.1 Peer Prediction and the Brier Scoring Rule
Peer prediction [21] is a useful method of inducing truthful reporting among players that hold data generated by the
same statistical model. In short, each player reports her data to an analyst and is paid based on how well her report
predicts the report of other players; tying each player’s payment to how closely it predicts peer reports is precisely
what induces truthfulness. [12] illustrate these ideas in the context of privacy-sensitive individuals through the use of
the Brier scoring rule [3] as a payment scheme among players holding a random bit. As we make use of the same
technique, we review here how the Brier scoring rule can be used for basic peer prediction.
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The basic Brier scoring rule was designed for the prediction of a binary event. Let I be an indicator of the event
occurring. Then the payment for reporting that the event will occur with probability q is,
BasicBrier(I, q) = 2Iq + 2(1− I)(1− q)− q2 − (1− q)2.
Following [12], we define an extension of the basic Brier scoring rule. For any p and q, we define the payment function
B(p, q) as follows:
B(p, q) = 1− 2(p− 2pq + q2)
Note that for the prediction of a binary event, B(p, q) is the expected payment according to BasicBrier(I, q)
when the event will occur with probability p and the agent submits prediction probability q. That is, B(p, q) =
EI∼p[BasicBrier(I, q)]. By design, B(p, q) is a strictly proper scoring rule, which means it is uniquely maximized
by a player truthful reporting her belief q about the probability of the event occurring.
Algorithms 1 and 2 use payment rule Ba,b(p, q), which is a parametrized rescaling of the scoring rule B(p, q),
defined as follows:
Ba,b(p, q) = a− b
(
p− 2pq + q2) .
Any positive-affine transformation of a strictly proper scoring rule remains strictly proper [2]. The rescaled Brier
scoring rule satisfies this criterion as Ba,b(p, q) = a′ + b′B(p, q) where a′ = a − b/2 and b′ = b/2 > 0. Thus
Ba,b(p, q) is a strictly proper scoring rule, and is uniquely maximized by reporting the true probability q = p.
For concreteness, we now provide an example to demonstrate how the payment rule B(p, q) can be used in peer
prediction to truthfully elicit players’ beliefs. Consider a set of n players, each holding a binary variable bi ∈ {0, 1}.
Assume that each of these variables is generated by independent Bernouli trials with parameter p, i.e., Pr(bi = 1) = p,
for every i ∈ [n]. We assume here that p is itself a random variable generated from a known prior over [0, 1]. Each
player reports a bit b˜i ∈ {0, 1} to the analyst, who wishes to estimate p as 1n
∑
i∈[n] b˜i. The analyst therefore wishes
to incentivize truthful reporting of the bits bi, through an appropriate payment scheme.
Let E[p | b] be expected value of p conditioned on observing that a player’s bit is b ∈ {0, 1}. Put differently,
for every player whose bit is b, E[p | b] captures her belief about the realization of p after she observes her own bit.
Consider the following payment rule. To generate the payment for player i, the analyst selects a player j uniformly at
random from [n] \ i and pays player i:
B(b˜j ,E[p | b˜i]) (3)
Lemma 4. [21] Under payments (3), truthful reporting is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Observe that for all q, q′ ∈ [0, 1], B(q′, q) is positive, so payments (3) are individually rational. Moreover, for
all q′ ∈ [0, 1], B(q′, q) is a strictly concave function of q maximized at q′ = q. Moreover,B(q′, q) is an affine function
of q′. If player i’s bit is bi and all other players report their bits truthfully (i.e., b˜j = bj for all j 6= i), then player i’s
expected payment is E
[
B(bj ,E[p | b˜i]) | bi
]
= B
(
E[bj | bi],E[p | b˜i]
)
= B
(
E[p | bi],E[p | b˜i]
)
. Hence, player i’s
payment is maximized when b˜i = bi.
Informally, the payment scheme (3) induces truthfulness by awarding a player the highest payment if the belief
induced on p by her reported bit “agrees” with the belief induced by the bit of a random peer. We note that instead
of the bit of a peer selected at random, any quantity whose expectation conditioned on bi would be equal to E[p | bi]
would work as input to the payment rule. For example, using the average value b¯S = 1|S|
∑
j∈S b˜j for any S ⊆ [n] \ i
as the first argument of B would also induce truthful reporting.
A.2 Properties of ridge regression
As mentioned in Section 2.2, the ridge regression estimator θˆR is biased, while the linear regression estimator θˆL is
unbiased. Nevertheless, in practice θˆR is preferable to θˆL as it can achieve a desirable trade-off between bias and
variance. In particular, consider the square loss error of the estimation θˆR, namely, E[‖θˆR − θ‖22]. If we condition on
the true parameter vector θ and the features X , this can be written as
E[‖θˆR − θ‖22] = E[‖θˆR − E[θˆR]‖22] + ‖E[θˆR]− θ‖22 = trace(Cov(θˆR)) + ‖ bias(θˆR)‖22 (4)
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where Cov(θˆR) = E[(θˆR−E[θˆR])(θˆR−E[θˆR])⊤] and bias(θˆR) = E[θˆR]−θ are the covariance and bias, respectively,
of estimator θˆR. Assuming that the responses y follow (1)3, then conditioned on X and θ, these can be computed in
closed form as:
Cov(θˆR) = σ2(γI +X⊤X)−1X⊤X(γI +X⊤X)−1, bias(θˆR) = −γ(γI +X⊤X)−1θ, (5)
where σ2 is the variance of the noise variables zi in (1). It is easy to see that decreasing γ decreases the bias, but may
significantly increase the variance. For example in the case where rank(X) < d, the matrix X⊤X is not invertible,
and the trace of the covariance tends to infinity as γ tends to zero.
Whether trace(Cov(θˆR)) is large and, therefore, whether regularizing the square loss is necessary, depends on
largest eigenvalue (i.e., the spectral norm) of (X⊤X)−1. Although this can be infinite for arbitrary X , if the xi’s
are drawn i.i.d. we expect that as n increases we will get estimates of lower variance. Indeed, by the law of large
numbers, we expect that if we sample the features xi independently from an isotropic distribution, then 1n (X
⊤X)
should converge to the covariance of this distribution (namely Σ = cI for some constant c). As such, for large n both
the largest and smallest eigenvalues of X⊤X should be of the order of n, leading to an estimation of ever decreasing
variance even when γ = 0. The following theorem, which follows as a corollary of a result by [25] (see Appendix C),
formalizes this notion, providing bounds on both the largest and smallest eigenvalue of X⊤X and γI +X⊤X .
Theorem 7. Let ξ ∈ (0, 1), and t ≥ 1. Let ‖ · ‖ denote the spectral norm. If {xi}i∈[n] are i.i.d. and sampled uniformly
from the unit ball, then with probability at least 1 − d−t2 , when n ≥ C( tξ )2(d + 2) log d, for some absolute constant
C, then, ∥∥X⊤X∥∥ ≤ (1 + ξ) 1
d+ 2
n, and
∥∥(X⊤X)−1∥∥ ≤ 1
(1− ξ) 1d+2n
, and
∥∥γI +X⊤X∥∥ ≤ γ + (1 + ξ) 1
d+ 2
n, and
∥∥(γI +X⊤X)−1∥∥ ≤ 1
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
.
Remark A generalization of Theorem 7 holds for {xi}i∈[n] sampled from any distribution with a covariance Σ
whose smallest eigenvalue is bounded away from zero (see [25]). We restrict our attention to the unit ball for simplicity
and concreteness.
A.3 The Billboard Lemma
A very useful result regarding jointly differentially private mechanisms that we use in our analysis is the so-called
“billboard-lemma”:
Lemma 5 (Billboard Lemma [15]). Let M : Dn → O be an ǫ-differentially private mechanism. Consider a set of
n functions hi : D × O → R, for i ∈ [n]. Then, the mechanism M′ : Dn → O × Rn that computes r = M(D)
and outputs M′(D) = (r, h1(Π2D, r), . . . , hn(ΠnD, r)), where Πi is the projection to player i’s data, is ǫ-jointly
differentially private.
In short, the billboard lemma implies that if we can construct payments such that the payment to player i depends
only on her data (e.g. xi, yi) and a universally observable output that is ǫ-differentially private (e.g., θˆ), then the
resulting mechanism will be ǫ-jointly differentially private.
B Proofs from Section 5
B.1 Proof of Theorem 2 (Privacy)
We will now prove that the estimator θˆP and the vector of payments π of the mechanism in Algorithm 2 is 2ǫ-jointly
differentially private. First, we need the following lemma to bound the sensitivity of θˆP , formally defined in Definition
9, which is the maximum change in the output when a single player misreports her data. For vector-valued outputs,
we measure this change with respect to the L2 norm.
3i.e., under truthful reporting.
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Definition 9 (Sensitivity). The sensitivity of a function f : D → R is the maximum L2 norm of the function’s output,
when a single player changes her input:
Sensitivity of f = max
D,D′, neighbors
‖f(D)− f(D′)‖2
The following lemma follows from [5]; a proof is provided for completeness.
Lemma 6. The sensitivity of θˆR is 1γ (4B + 2M).
Proof. Let (X, y) and (X ′, y′) be two arbitrary neighboring databases that differ only in the i-th entry. Let θˆR and
(θˆR)′ respectively denote the ridge regression estimators computed on (X, y) and (X ′, y′). Define g(θ) to be the
change in loss when θ is used as an estimator for (X ′, y′) and (X, y).
g(θ) = L(θ;X ′, y′)− L(θ;X, y)
=
(
θ⊤xi − yi
)2 − (θ⊤x′i − y′i)2
Lemma 7 of [5] says that if L(θ;X, y) and L(θ;X ′, y′) are both Γ-strongly convex, then
∥∥∥θˆR − (θˆR)′∥∥∥
2
is bounded
above by 1Γ · maxθ ‖∇g(θ)‖2. By Lemma 13 (in Appendix E), both L(θ;X, y) and L(θ;X ′, y′) are 2γ-strongly
convex, so
∥∥∥θˆR − (θˆR)′∥∥∥
2
≤ 12γ ·maxθ ‖∇g(θ)‖2. We now bound ‖∇g(θ)‖2 for an arbitrary θ.
‖∇g(θ)‖2 = 2
∥∥(θ⊤xi − yi)xi − (θ⊤x′i − y′i)x′i∥∥2
≤ 4 ∣∣θ⊤xi − yi∣∣ ‖xi‖2
≤ 4 (∣∣θ⊤xi∣∣+ |yi|)
≤ 4(2B +M)
Since this bound holds for all θ, it must be the case that maxθ ‖∇g(θ)‖2 ≤ 4(2B +M) as well. Then by Lemma 7 of
[5], ∥∥∥θˆR − (θˆR)′∥∥∥
2
≤ 4
2γ
(2B +M) =
1
γ
(4B + 2M).
Since (X, y) and (X ′, y′) were two arbitrary neighboring databases, this bounds the sensitivity of the computation.
Thus changing the input of one player can change the ridge regression estimator (with respect to the L2 norm) by at
most 1γ (4B + 2M).
We now prove that the output of Algorithm 2 satisfies 2ǫ-joint differential privacy.
Theorem 2 (Privacy). The mechanism in Algorithm 2 is 2ǫ-jointly differentially private.
Proof. We begin by showing that the estimator θˆP output by Algorithm 2 is ǫ-differentially private.
Let h denote the PDF of θˆP output by Algorithm 2, and ν denote the PDF of the noise vector v. Let (X, y) and
(X ′, y′) be any two databases that differ only in the i-th entry, and let θˆR and (θˆR)′ respectively denote the ridge
regression estimators computed on these two databases.
The output estimator θˆP is the sum of the ridge regression estimator θˆR, and the noise vector v; the only random-
ness in the choice of θˆP is the noise vector, because θˆR is computed deterministically on the data. Thus the probability
that Algorithm 2 outputs a particular θˆP is equal to the probability that the noise vector is exactly the difference
between θˆP and θˆR. Fixing an arbitrary θˆP , let vˆ = θˆP − θˆR and vˆ′ = θˆP − (θˆR)′. Then,
h(θˆP |(X, y))
h(θˆP |(X ′, y′)) =
ν(vˆ)
ν(vˆ′)
= exp
( −γǫ
8B + 4M
(‖vˆ‖2 − ‖vˆ′‖2)
)
= exp
(
γǫ
8B + 4M
(‖vˆ′‖2 − ‖vˆ‖2)
)
(6)
By definition, θˆP = θˆR + vˆ = (θˆR)′ + vˆ′. Rearranging terms gives θˆR − (θˆR)′ = vˆ′ − vˆ. By Lemma 6 and the
triangle inequality,
‖vˆ′‖2 − ‖vˆ‖2 ≤ ‖vˆ′ − vˆ‖2 =
∥∥∥θˆR − (θˆR)′∥∥∥
2
≤ 1
γ
(4B + 2M)
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Plugging this into Equation (6) gives the desired inequality,
h(θˆP |(X, y))
h(θˆP |(X ′, y′)) ≤ exp
(
γǫ
4B + 2M
1
γ
(4B + 2M)
)
= exp(ǫ).
Next, we show that the output (θˆP , θˆP0 , θˆP1 , {πi}i∈[n]) of the mechanism satisfies joint differential privacy using
the Billboard Lemma. The estimators θˆP0 and θˆP1 are computed in the same way as θˆP , so θˆP0 and θˆP1 each satisfy
ǫ-differential privacy. Since θˆP0 and θˆP1 are computed on disjoint subsets of the data, then by Theorem 4 of [20],
together they satisfy ǫ-differential privacy. The estimator a player should use to compute her payments depends only
on the partition of players, which is independent of the data because it is chosen uniformly at random. Thus by the
Composition Theorem in [9], the estimators (θˆP , θˆP0 , θˆP1 ) together satisfy 2ǫ-differential privacy.
Each player’s payment πi is a function of only her private information — her report (xi, yˆi) and her group in
the partition of players — and the 2ǫ-differentially private vector of estimators (θˆP , θˆP0 , θˆP1 ). Then by the Billboard
Lemma 5, the output (θˆP , θˆP0 , θˆP1 , {πi}i∈[n]) of Algorithm 2 satisfies 2ǫ-joint differential privacy.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 3 (Truthfulness)
In order to show that στα,β is an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium, we require the following three lemmas. Lemma
7 bounds the expected number of players who will misreport under the strategy profile στα,β . Lemma 8 bounds the
norm of the expected difference of two estimators output by Algorithm 2 run on different datasets, as a function of the
number of players whose data differs between the two datasets. Lemma 9 bounds the first two moments of the noise
vector that is added to preserve privacy.
Lemma 7. Under symmetric strategy profile στα,β , each player expects that at most an α-fraction of other players
will misreport, given Assumption 2.
Proof. Let S−i denote the set of players other than i who truthfully report under strategy στα,β . From the perspective
of player i, the cost coefficients of all other players are drawn independently from the posterior marginal distribu-
tion C|xi,yi . By the definition of τα,β , player i believes that each other player truthfully reports independently with
probability at least 1− α. Thus E[|S−i| |xi, yi] ≥ (1− α)(n− 1).
Lemma 8. Let θˆR and (θˆR)′ be the ridge regression estimators on two fixed databases that differ on the input of at
most k players. Then ∥∥∥θˆR − (θˆR)′∥∥∥
2
≤ k
γ
(4B + 2M)
Proof. Since the two databases differ on the reports of at most k players, we can define a sequence of databases
D0, . . . , Dk, that each differ from the previous database in the input of at most one player, and D0 is the input that
generated θˆR, and Dk is the input that generated (θˆR)′. Consider running Algorithm 2 on each database Dj in the
sequence. For each Dj , let θˆRj be the ridge regression estimator computed on Dj . Note that θˆR0 = θˆR and θˆRk = (θˆR)′.∥∥∥θˆR − (θˆR)′∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥θˆR0 − θˆRk ∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∥θˆR0 − θˆR1 + θˆR1 − . . .− θˆRk−1 + θˆRk−1 − θˆRk ∥∥∥
2
≤
∥∥∥θˆR0 − θˆR1 ∥∥∥
2
+
∥∥∥θˆR1 − θˆR2 ∥∥∥
2
+ . . .+
∥∥∥θˆRk−1 − θˆRk ∥∥∥
2
≤ k ·max
j
∥∥∥θˆRj − θˆRj+1∥∥∥
2
For each j, θˆRj and θˆRj+1 are the ridge regression estimators computed on databases that differ in the data of at most a
single player. That means either the databases are the same, so θˆRj = θˆRj+1 and their normed difference is 0, or they
differ in the report of exactly one player. In the latter case, Lemma 6 bounds ‖θˆRj − θˆRj+1‖2 above by 1γ (4B + 2M)
for each j, including the j which maximizes the normed difference.
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Combining this fact with the above inequalities gives,
∥∥∥θˆR − (θˆR)′∥∥∥
2
≤ k
γ
(4B + 2M).
Lemma 9. The noise vector v added in Algorithm 2 satisfies: E[v] = ~0 and E[‖v‖22] = 2
(
4B+2M
γǫ
)2
and E[‖v‖2] =
4B+2M
γǫ .
Proof. For every v¯ ∈ Rd, there exists −v¯ ∈ Rd that is drawn with the same probability, because ‖v¯‖2 = ‖ − v¯‖2.
Thus,
E[v] =
∫
v¯
v¯ Pr(v = v¯)dv¯ =
1
2
∫
v¯
(v¯ +−v¯) Pr(v = v¯)dv¯ = ~0.
The distribution of v is a high dimensional Laplacian with parameter 4B+2Mγǫ and mean zero. It follows immedi-
ately that E[‖v‖22] = 2
(
4B+2M
γǫ
)2
and E[‖v‖2] = 4B+2Mγǫ .
We now prove that symmetric threshold strategy στα,β is an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium in Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3 (Truthfulness). Fix a participation goal 1− α, a privacy parameter ǫ, a desired confidence parameter β,
ξ ∈ (0, 1), and t ≥ 1. Then under Assumptions 1 and 2, with probability 1 − dt2 and when n ≥ C( tξ )2(d+ 2) log d,
the symmetric threshold strategy στα,β is an η-approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium in Algorithm 2 for
η = b
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
)2
+ τα,βǫ
2.
Proof. Suppose all players other than i are following strategy στα,β . Let player i be in group 1 − j, so she is paid
according to the estimator computed on the data of group j. Let θˆPj be the estimator output by Algorithm 2 on the
reported data of group j under this strategy, and let (θˆRj )′ be the ridge regression estimator computed within Algorithm
2 when all players in group j follow strategy στα,β . Let θˆRj be the ridge regression estimator that would have been
computed within Algorithm 2 if all players in group j had reported truthfully. For ease of notation, we will suppress
the subscripts on the estimators for the remainder of the proof.
We will show that στα,β is an approximate Bayes-Nash equilibrium by bounding player i’s incentive to deviate.
We assume that ci ≤ τα,β (otherwise there is nothing to show because player i would be allowed to submit an arbitrary
report under στα,β ). We first compute the maximum amount that player i can increase her payment by misreporting to
Algorithm 2. Consider the expected payment to player i from a fixed (deterministic) misreport, yˆi = yi + δ.
E[Ba,b((θˆ
P )⊤xi,E[θ|xi, yˆi]⊤xi)|xi, yi]− E[Ba,b((θˆP )⊤xi,E[θ|xi, yi]⊤xi)|xi, yi]
= Ba,b(E[θˆ
P |xi, yi]⊤xi,E[θ|xi, yˆi]⊤xi)−Ba,b(E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi,E[θ|xi, yi]⊤xi)
The rule Ba,b is a proper scoring rule, so it is uniquely maximized when its two arguments are equal. Thus any
misreport of player i cannot yield payment greater than Ba,b(E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi,E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi), so the expression of
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interest is bounded above by the following.
Ba,b(E[θˆ
P |xi, yi]⊤xi,E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi)−Ba,b(E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi,E[θ|xi, yi]⊤xi)
= a− b
(
E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi − 2(E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi)2 + (E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi)2
)
− a+ b
(
E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi − 2(E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi)(E[θ|xi, yi]⊤xi) + (E[θ|xi, yi]⊤xi)2
)
= b
(
(E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi)2 − 2(E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi)(E[θ|xi, yi]⊤xi) + (E[θ|xi, yi]⊤xi)2
)
= b
(
E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi − E[θ|xi, yi]⊤xi
)2
= b
(
E[θˆP − θ|xi, yi]⊤xi
)2
≤ b(‖E[θˆP − θ|xi, yi]‖22‖xi‖22)
≤ b‖E[θˆP − θ|xi, yi]‖22
We continue by bounding the term ‖E[θˆP − θ|xi, yi]‖2.
‖E[θˆP − θ|xi, yi]‖2 = ‖E[θˆP − θˆR + θˆR − θ|xi, yi]‖2
= ‖E[(θˆR)′ + v − θˆR + θˆR − θ|xi, yi]‖2
= ‖E[v|xi, yi] + E[(θˆR)′ − θˆR|xi, yi] + E[θˆR − θ|xi, yi]‖2
≤ ‖E[v|xi, yi]‖2 + ‖E[(θˆR)′ − θˆR|xi, yi]‖2 + ‖E[θˆR − θ|xi, yi]‖2
We again bound each term separately. In the first term, the noise vector is drawn independently of the data, so
E[v|xi, yi] = E[v], which equals ~0 by Lemma 9. Thus ‖E[v|xi, yi]‖2 = 0.
Jensen’s inequality bounds the second term above by E[‖(θˆR)′− θˆR‖2|xi, yi]. The random variables (θˆR)′ and θˆR
are the ridge regression estimators of two (random) databases that differ only on the data of players who misreported
under threshold strategy στα,β . By Lemma 7, player i believes that at most αn players will misreport their yˆj ,4 so for
all pairs of databases over which the expectation is taken, (θˆR)′ and θˆR differ in the input of at most αn players. By
Lemma 8, their normed difference is bounded above by αnγ (4B + 2M). Since this bound applied to every term over
which the expectation is taken, it also bounds the expectation.
For the third term, E[θˆR − θ|xi, yi] = bias(θˆR|xi, yi). Recall that θˆR is actually θˆRj , which is computed indepen-
dently of player i’s data, but is still correlated with (xi, yi) through the common parameter θ. However, conditioned
on the true θ, the bias of θˆR is independent of player i’s data. That is, bias(θˆR|xi, yi, θ) = bias(θˆR|θ). We now
expand the third term using nested expectations.
EX,z,θ
[
θˆR − θ|xi, yi
]
= Eθ
[
EX,z [θˆ
R − θ|xi, yi, θ]
]
= Eθ
[
bias(θˆR|xi, yi, θ)
]
= Eθ
[
bias(θˆR|θ)
]
= bias(θˆR)
= −γ(γI +X⊤X)−1θ
4Lemma 7 promises that at most α(n− 1) players will misreport. We use the weaker bound of αn for simplicity.
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Then by Theorem 7, when n ≥ C( tξ )2(d+ 2) log d, the following holds with probability at least 1− d−t
2
.
‖E[θˆR − θ|xi, yi]‖2 = ‖ − γ(γI +X⊤X)−1θ‖2
≤ γ‖(γI +X⊤X)−1‖2‖θ‖2
≤ γ
(
1
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
)
B
=
γB
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
We will assume the above is true for the remainder of the proof, which will be the case except with probability
at most d−t
2
. Thus with probability at least 1 − d−t2 , and when n is sufficiently large, the increase in payment from
misreporting is bounded above by
b‖E[θˆP − θ|xi, yi]‖22 ≤ b
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
)2
.
In addition to an increased payment, a player may also experience decreased privacy costs from misreporting. By
Assumption 1, this decrease in privacy costs is bounded above by ciǫ2. We have assumed ci ≤ τα,β (otherwise player
i is allowed to misreport arbitrarily under στα,β , and there is nothing to show). Then the decrease in privacy costs for
player i is bounded above by τα,βǫ2.
Therefore player i’s total incentive to deviate is bounded above by η, and the symmetric threshold strategy στα,β
forms an η-approximate Bayes Nash equilibrium for
η = b
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
)2
+ τα,βǫ
2.
B.3 Proof of Theorem 4 (Accuracy)
In this section, we prove that the estimator θˆP output by Algorithm 2 has high accuracy. We first require the following
lemma, which uses the concentration inequalities of Theorem 7 to give high probability bounds on the distance from
the ridge regression estimator to the true parameter θ.
Lemma 10. Let θˆR be the ridge regression estimator computed on a given database (X, y). Then with probability at
least 1− d−t2 , as long as n ≥ C( tξ )2(d+ 2) log d
E[‖θˆR − θ‖22] ≤
(
γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
)2
+ σ4
(
(1 + ξ) 1d+2n
(γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n)2
)2
and
E[‖θˆR − θ‖2] ≤ γB +Mn
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
.
Proof. Recall from Section A.2 that,
E[‖θˆR − θ‖22] = ‖ bias(θˆR)‖22 + trace(Cov(θˆR)),
and,
E[‖θˆR − θ‖2] = E[‖θˆR − E[θˆR] + E[θˆR]− θ‖2]
≤ E[‖θˆR − E[θˆR]‖2] + E[‖E[θˆR]− θ‖2]
= E[‖θˆR − E[θˆR]‖2] + E[‖ bias(θˆR)‖2]
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We now expand the remaining terms: ‖ bias(θˆR)‖2 and trace(Cov(θˆR)) and E[‖θˆR−E[θˆR]‖2]. For the remain-
der of the proof, we will assume the concentration inequalities in Theorem 7 hold, which will be the case, except with
probability at most d−t2 , as long as n ≥ C( tξ )2(d+ 2) log d.
‖ bias(θˆR)‖2 = ‖ − γ(γI +X⊤X)−1θ‖2
≤ γ‖θ‖2‖(γI +X⊤X)−1‖2
≤ γB‖(γI +X⊤X)−1‖2
≤ γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
trace(Cov(θˆR)) = ‖ Cov(θˆR)‖22
= ‖σ2(γI +X⊤X)−1X⊤X(γI +X⊤X)−1‖22
≤ σ4‖(γI +X⊤X)−1‖22‖X⊤X‖22‖(γI +X⊤X)−1‖22
≤ σ4
(
1
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
)2(
(1 + ξ)
1
d+ 2
n
)2(
1
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
)2
≤ σ4

 (1 + ξ) 1d+2n(
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
)2


2
E[‖θˆR − E[θˆR]‖2] = E[‖θˆR − (θ + bias(θˆR))‖2]
= E[‖(γI +X⊤X)−1X⊤y − θ + (γI +X⊤X)−1γIθ‖2]
= E[‖(γI +X⊤X)−1X⊤(Xθ + z)− θ + (γI +X⊤X)−1γIθ‖2]
= E[‖(γI +X⊤X)−1(X⊤X + γI)θ − θ + (γI +X⊤X)−1X⊤z‖2]
= E[‖θ − θ + (γI +X⊤X)−1X⊤z‖2]
= E[‖(γI +X⊤X)−1X⊤z‖2]
≤ E[‖(γI +X⊤X)−1‖2‖X⊤z‖2]
≤ E[‖(γI +X⊤X)−1‖2Mn]
≤ Mn
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
Using these bounds, we see:
E[‖θˆR − θ‖22] ≤
(
γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
)2
+ σ4
(
(1 + ξ) 1d+2n
(γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n)2
)2
and
E[‖θˆR − θ‖2] ≤ γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
+
Mn
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
=
γB +Mn
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
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We now prove the accuracy guarantee for the estimator θˆP output by Algorithm 2.
Theorem 4 (Accuracy). Fix a participation goal 1 − α, a privacy parameter ǫ, a desired confidence parameter β,
ξ ∈ (0, 1), and t ≥ 1. Then under the symmetric threshold strategy στα,β , Algorithm 2 will output an estimator θˆP
such that with probability at least 1− β − d−t2 , and when n ≥ C( tξ )2(d+ 2) log d,
E[‖θˆP − θ‖22] = O
((
αn
γ
+
1
γǫ
)2
+
(γ
n
)2
+
(
1
n
)2
+
αn
γ
+
1
γǫ
)
.
Proof. Let the data held by players be (X, y), and let yˆ = y + ~δ be the reports of players under the threshold strategy
στα,β . As in Theorem 3, let θˆP be the estimator output by Algorithm 2 on the reported data under this strategy, and let
(θˆR)′ be the ridge regression estimator computed Algorithm 2 when all players follow strategy στα,β . Let θˆR be the
ridge regression estimator that would have been computed within Algorithm 2 if all players had reported truthfully.
Recall that v is the noise vector added in Algorithm 2.
E[‖θˆP − θ‖22] = E[‖θˆP − θˆR + θˆR − θ‖22]
= E
[
‖θˆP − θˆR‖22 + ‖θˆR − θ‖22 + 2
〈
θˆP − θˆR, θˆR − θ
〉]
≤ E[‖θˆP − θˆR‖22] + E[‖θˆR − θ‖22] + 2E[‖θˆP − θˆR‖2‖θˆR − θ‖2]
We start by bounding the first term. Recall that the estimator θˆP is equal to the ridge regression estimator on the
reported data, plus the noise vector v added by Algorithm 2.
E[‖θˆP − θˆR‖22] = E[‖(θˆR)′ + v − θˆR‖22]
= E[‖(θˆR)′ − θˆR‖22] + E[‖v‖22] + 2E[〈(θˆR)′ − θˆR, v〉]
= E[‖(θˆR)′ − θˆR‖22] + E[‖v‖22] + 2〈E[(θˆR)′ − θˆR],E[v]〉
= E[‖(θˆR)′ − θˆR‖22] + 2
(
4B + 2M
γǫ
)2
(by Lemma 9)
The estimators (θˆR)′ and θˆR are the ridge regression estimators of two (random) databases that differ only on the
data of players who misreported under threshold strategy στα,β . The definition of τα,β ensures us that with probability
1 − β, at most αn players will misreport their yˆj . For the remainder of the proof, we will assume that at most αn
players misreported to the mechanism, which will be the case except with probability β.
Thus for all pairs of databases over which the expectation is taken, (θˆR)′ and θˆR differ in the input of at most αn
players, and by Lemma 8, their normed difference is bounded above by
(
αn
γ (4B + 2M)
)2
. Since this bound applies
to every term over which the expectation is taken, it also bounds the expectation.
Thus the first term satisfies the following bound:
E[‖θˆP − θ‖22] ≤
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M)
)2
+ 2
(
4B + 2M
γǫ
)2
.
By Lemma 10, with probability at least 1−d−t2 , when n ≥ C( tξ )2(d+2) log d, the second term is bounded above
by
E[‖θˆR − θ‖22] ≤
(
γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
)2
+ σ4
(
(1 + ξ) 1d+2n
(γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n)2
)2
.
We will also assume for the remainder of the proof that the above bound holds, which will be the case except with
probability at most d−t2 .
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We now bound the third term.
2E[‖θˆP − θˆR‖2‖θˆR − θ‖2] = 2E[‖(θˆR)′ + v − θˆR‖2‖θˆR − θ‖2]
≤ 2E[
(
‖(θˆR)′ − θˆR‖2 + ‖v‖2
)
‖θˆR − θ‖2]
= 2E[‖(θˆR)′ − θˆR‖2‖θˆR − θ‖2] + 2E[‖v‖2‖θˆR − θ‖2]
= 2E[‖(θˆR)′ − θˆR‖2‖θˆR − θ‖2] + 2E[‖v‖2]E[‖θˆR − θ‖2] (by independence)
= 2E[‖(θˆR)′ − θˆR‖2‖θˆR − θ‖2] + 2
(
4B + 2M
γǫ
)
E[‖θˆR − θ‖2] (by Lemma 9)
We have assumed at most αn players misreported (which will occur with probability at least 1 − β), so for all
pairs of databases over which the expectation in the first term is taken, Lemma 8 bounds ‖(θˆR)′ − θˆR‖ above by
αn
γ (4B + 2M). Thus we continue bonding the third term:
2E[‖(θˆR)′ − θˆR‖2‖θˆR − θ‖2] + 2
(
4B + 2M
γǫ
)
E[‖θˆR − θ‖2]
≤ 2E[
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M)
)
‖θˆR − θ‖2] + 24B + 2M
γǫ
E[‖θˆR − θ‖2] (by Lemma 8)
= 2
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M)
)
E[‖θˆR − θ‖2] + 24B + 2M
γǫ
E[‖θˆR − θ‖2]
= 2
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
4B + 2M
γǫ
)
E[‖θˆR − θ‖2]
≤ 2
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
4B + 2M
γǫ
)
γB +Mn
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
(by Lemma 10)
We can now plug these terms back in to get our final accuracy bound. Taking a union bound over the two failure
probabilities, with probability at least 1− β − d−t2 , when n ≥ C( tξ )2(d+ 2) log d:
E[‖θˆP − θ‖22] ≤
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M)
)2
+ 2
(
4B + 2M
γǫ
)2
+
(
γB
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
)2
+ σ4
(
(1 + ξ) 1d+2n
(γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n)2
)2
+ 2
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
4B + 2M
γǫ
)
γB +Mn
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
B.4 Proof of Theorems 5 and 6 (Individual Rationality and Budget)
In this section we first characterize the conditions needed for individual rationality, and then compute the total budget
required from the analyst to run the Private Regression Mechanism in Algorithm 2. Note that if we do not require
individual rationality, it is easy to achieve a small budget: we can scale down payments as in the non-private mechanism
from Section 3. However, once players have privacy concerns, they will no longer accept an arbitrarily small positive
payment; each player must be paid enough to compensate for her privacy loss. In order to incentivize players to
participate in the mechanism, the analyst will have to ensure that players receive non-negative utility from participation.
We first show that Algorithm 2 is individually rational for players with privacy costs below threshold. Note that
because we allow cost parameters to be unbounded, it is not possible in general to ensure individual rationality for all
players while maintaining a finite budget.
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Theorem 5 (Individual Rationality). Under Assumption 1, the mechanism in Algorithm 2 is individually rational for
all players with cost parameters ci ≤ τα,β as long as,
a ≥
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
+B
)
(b+ 2bB) + bB2 + τα,βǫ
2,
regardless of the reports from players with cost coefficients above τα,β .
Proof. Let player i have privacy cost parameter ci ≤ τα,β , and consider player i’s utility from participating in the
mechanism. Let player i be in group 1− j, so she is paid according to the estimator computed on the data of group j.
Let θˆPj be the estimator output by Algorithm 2 on the reported data of group j under this strategy, and let (θˆRj )′ be the
ridge regression estimator computed within Algorithm 2 when all players in group j follow strategy στα,β . Let θˆRj be
the ridge regression estimator that would have been computed within Algorithm 2 if all players in group j had reported
truthfully. For ease of notation, we will suppress the subscripts on the estimators for the remainder of the proof.
E[ui(xi, yi, yˆi)] = E[Ba,b((θˆ
P )⊤xi,E[θ|xi, yˆi]⊤xi)|xi, yi]− E[fi(ci, ǫ)]
≥ E[Ba,b((θˆP )⊤xi,E[θ|xi, yˆi]⊤xi)|xi, yi]− τα,βǫ2 (by Assump. 1)
= Ba,b(E[θˆ
P |xi, yi]⊤xi,E[θ|xi, yˆi]⊤xi)− τα,βǫ2
We proceed by bounding the inputs to the payment rule, and thus lower-bounding the payment player i receives.
The second input satisfies the following bound.
E[θ|xi, yˆi]⊤xi ≤ ‖E[θ|xi, yˆi]‖2‖xi‖2 ≤ B
We can also bound the first input to the payment rule as follows.
E[θˆP |xi, yi]⊤xi = E[(θˆR)′|xi, yi]⊤xi + E[v|xi, yi]⊤xi
= E[(θˆR)′|xi, yi]⊤xi
≤ ‖E[(θˆR)′|xi, yi]‖2‖xi‖2
≤ ‖E[(θˆR)′ − θˆR|xi, yi]‖2 + ‖E[θˆR − θ|xi, yi]‖2 + ‖E[θ|xi, yi]‖2
≤ αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
+B (by Lemma 8 and Theorem 7)
Recall that our Brier-based payment rule is Ba,b(p, q) = a − b
(
p− 2pq + q2), which is bounded below by
a− b|p| − 2b|p| |q| − b|q|2 = a− |p|(b + 2b|q|)− b|q|2. Using the bounds we just computed on the inputs to player
i’s payment rule, her payment is at least
πi ≥ a−
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
+B
)
(b+ 2bB)− bB2.
Thus her expected utility from participating in the mechanism is at least
E[ui(xi, yi, yˆi)] ≥ a−
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
+B
)
(b+ 2bB)− bB2 − τα,βǫ2.
Player i will be ensured non-negative utility as long as,
a ≥
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
+B
)
(b+ 2bB) + bB2 + τα,βǫ
2.
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The next theorem characterizes the total budget required by the analyst to run Algorithm 2.
Theorem 6 (Budget). The total budget required by the analyst to run Algorithm 2 when players utilize threshold
equilibrium strategy στα,β is
B ≤ n
[
a+
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
+B
)
(b+ 2bB)
]
.
Proof. The total budget is the sum of payments to all players.
B =
n∑
i=1
E[πi] =
n∑
i=1
E[Ba,b((θˆ
P )⊤xi,E[θ|xi, yˆi]⊤xi)|xi, yi]
=
n∑
i=1
Ba,b(E[θˆ
P |xi, yi]⊤xi,E[θ|xi, yˆi]⊤xi)
Recall that our Brier-based payment rule is Ba,b(p, q) = a− b
(
p− 2pq + q2), which is bounded above by a+ b|p|+
2b|p| |q| = a+ |p|(b+ 2b|q|). Using the bounds computed in the proof of Theorem 5, each player i receives payment
at most,
πi ≥ a+
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
+B
)
(b+ 2bB).
Thus the total budget is at most:
B =
n∑
i=1
E[πi] ≤ n
(
a+
(
αn
γ
(4B + 2M) +
γB
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
+B
)
(b+ 2bB)
)
.
B.5 Proof of Lemma 3 (Bound on threshold τα,β)
Lemma 3. For a cost distribution C with conditional marginal CDF lower bounded by some function F :
min
xi,yi
(
Pr
cj∼C|xi,yi
[cj ≤ τ ]
)
≥ F (τ),
then
τα,β ≤ max{F−1(1− αβ), F−1(1− α)}.
Proof. We first bound τ1α,β .
τ1α,β = infτ
(
Pr
c∼C
[|{i : ci ≤ τ}| ≥ (1− α)n] ≥ 1− β
)
= inf
τ
(
Pr
c∼C
[|{i : ci ≥ τ}| ≤ αn] ≥ 1− β
)
= inf
τ
(
1− Pr
c∼C
[|{i : ci ≥ τ}| ≥ αn] ≥ 1− β
)
= inf
τ
(
Pr
c∼C
[|{i : ci ≥ τ}| ≥ αn] ≤ β
)
We continue by upper bounding the inner term of the expression.
Pr
c∼C
[|{i : ci ≥ τ}| ≥ αn] ≤ E[|{i : ci ≥ τ}|
αn
(by Markov’s inequality)
=
n Pr[ci ≥ τ ]
αn
(by independence of costs)
=
Pr[ci ≥ τ ]
α
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From this bound, if Pr[ci≥τ ]α ≤ β, then also Prc∼C [|{i : ci ≥ τ}| ≥ αn] ≤ β. Thus,
inf
τ
(
Pr
c∼C
[|{i : ci ≥ τ}| ≥ αn] ≤ β
)
≤ inf
τ
(
Pr[ci ≥ τ ]
α
≤ β
)
,
since the infimum in the first expression is taken over a superset of the feasible region of the latter expression. Then,
τ1α,β ≤ infτ
(
Pr[ci ≥ τ ]
α
≤ β
)
= inf
τ
(Pr[ci ≥ τ ] ≤ αβ)
= inf
τ
(1− Pr[ci ≤ τ ] ≤ αβ)
= inf
τ
(C(τ) ≥ 1− αβ)
≤ inf
τ
(F (τ) ≥ 1− αβ)
(since the extremal conditional marginal bounds the unconditioned marginal)
= inf
τ
(
τ ≥ F−1(1 − αβ))
= F−1(1− αβ)
Thus under our assumptions, τ1α,β ≤ F−1(1 − αβ).
We now bound τ2α.
τ2α = infτ
(
min
xi,yi
(
Prcj∼C|xi,yi [cj ≤ τ ]
) ≥ 1− α)
≤ inf
τ
(F (τ) ≥ 1− α)
= inf
τ
(
τ ≥ F−1(1− α))
= F−1(1− α)
Finally,
τα,β = max{τ1α,β , τ2α} ≤ max{F−1(1 − αβ), F−1(1− α)}.
B.6 Proof of Corollary 1 (Main result)
Corollary 1 (Main result (Formal)). Choose δ ∈ (0, p2+2p ). Then under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, setting α = n−δ,
β = n−
p
2+δ(1+p), ǫ = n−1+δ, γ = n1−
δ
2 , a = (6B + 2M)(1 + B)2n−
3
2 + n−
3
2+δ , b = n−
3
2 , ξ = 1/2, and
t =
√
n
4C(d+2) log d in Algorithm 2 ensures that with probability 1− dΘ(−n) − n−
p
2+δ(1+p):
1. the output of Algorithm 2 is O (n−1+δ)-jointly differentially private,
2. it is an O
(
n−
3
2+δ
)
-approximate Bayes Nash equilibrium for a 1 − O (n−δ) fraction of players to truthfully
report their data,
3. the computed estimate θˆP is O
(
n−δ
)
-accurate,
4. it is individually rational for a 1−O (n−δ) fraction of players to participate in the mechanism, and
5. the required budget from the analyst is O
(
n−
1
2+δ
)
.
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Proof. Choose δ ∈ (0, p2+2p ). Note that this ensures δ < 1/2. Let α = n−δ and β = n
p
2−δ(1+p) as we have chosen.
By the constraint that δ < p2+2p , we have ensured that β = o(1). By Lemma 3, τα,β ≤ max{(αβ)−1/p, α−1/p} =
(αβ)−1/p since α, β = o(1) and p > 1. Then τα,β = O
(
n1−δ
)
.
Setting ξ = 1/2 and t =
√
n
4C(d+2) log d , we ensure that with probability 1 − d−
n
4C(d+2) log d = 1 − dΘ(−n), the
bounds stated in Theorem 7 hold. With probability 1 − β, at most an α-fraction of players will have cost parameters
above τα,β . Taking a union bound over these two failure probabilities, the bounds in Theorems 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 will
all hold with probability at least 1− dΘ(−n)−n−p2+δ(1+p). For the remainder of the proof, we will assume all bounds
hold, which will happen with at least the probability specified above.
First note that by Theorem 2, Algorithm 2 is 2ǫ-jointly differentially private. By our choice of ǫ, the privacy
guarantee is 2n−1+δ = o(
√
n).
Recall that by Theorem 3, it is a
[
b
(
αn
γ (4B + 2M) +
γB
γ+(1−ξ) 1
d+2n
)2
+ τα,βǫ
2
]
-approximate Bayes-Nash equi-
librium for a (1 − α)-fraction of players to truthfully report their data. Taking B, M , ξ, and d to be constants, it is a
Θ
(
b
(
αn
γ +
γ
n
)2
+ τα,βǫ
2
)
-approximate BNE. To achieve the desired truthfulness bound, we require (among other
things) that τα,βǫ2 = o( 1n ). Given the bound on τα,β , it would suffice to have ǫ = o(n−
3
4+
δ
2 ). This is satisfied by
our choice of ǫ = n−1+δ because δ < 1/2. After setting b = o( 1n ), we will have the desired truthfulness bound if
αn
γ +
γ
γ+n = o(1). This implies the following constraints on γ: we require γ = ω(nα) = ω(n
1−δ) and γ = o(n).
Our choice of γ = n1− δ2 satisfies these requirements. Due to our choice of b = n−3/2, the approximation factor will
be dominated by τα,βǫ2 = O
(
n−
3
2+δ
)
= o(1). Thus truthtelling is an O
(
n−
3
2+δ
)
= o(1)-approximate Bayes-Nash
equilibrium for all but an n−δ = o(1)-fraction of players.
Recall from Theorem 4 that the estimator θˆP is O
((
αn
γ +
1
γǫ
)2
+
(
γ
γ+n
)2
+
(
1
n
)2
+ αnγ +
1
γǫ
)
-accurate. We
have already established that αnγ = o(1) and
γ
γ+n = o(1). Trivially,
1
n2 = o(1). We turn now to the term
1
γǫ . For this
term to be o(1), we require γ = ω(1ǫ ) = ω
(
n1−δ
)
. Our choice of γ = n1− δ2 ensures this requirement is satisfied.
Since αnγ +
1
γǫ = o(1), then so must be
(
αn
γ +
1
γǫ
)2
= o(1). The accuracy bound will be dominated by three terms:
first
(
γ
n
)2
= n−δ , second αnγ = n
− δ2 , and third 1γǫ = n
− δ2
. Thus, Algorithm 2 outputs an estimator with accuracy
O
(
n−
δ
2
)
= o(1).
Theorem 5 says that the mechanism in Algorithm 2 is individually rational for a (1−α)-fraction of players as long
as a ≥
(
αn
γ (4B + 2M) +
γB
γ+(1−ξ) 1
d+2n
+B
)
(b+2bB)+bB2+τα,βǫ
2
. We now expand each term of this expression
to prove that our choice of a satisfies the desired bound. Consider the first term: αnγ (4B + 2M) = n
− δ2 (4B + 2M).
This term is decreasing in n, so it can be upper bounded by its value when n = 1. Thus αnγ (4B + 2M) ≤ 4B + 2M .
Now consider the second term:
γB
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
=
n1−
δ
2B
n1−
δ
2 + 12(d+2)n
=
n−
δ
2B
n−
δ
2 + 12(d+2)
= B
(
1− 1
2(d+ 2)n−
δ
2 + 1
)
The final term −1
2(d+2)n−
δ
2 +1
is always negative, so the entire term γB
γ+(1−ξ) 1
d+2n
can be bounded above by B. We
can simplify the expression b + 2bB + bB2 as (1 + B)2b = (1 + B)2n−3/2. Finally, as noted earlier (and due
to to Lemma 3), we can upper bound τα,βǫ2 ≤ n− 32+δ . Combining all of these bounds, it would suffice to set
a ≥ (6B + 2M)(1 + B)2n−3/2 + n− 32+δ. We set a to be exactly this bound. Then it is individually rational for a
1− α = 1− n−δ = 1− o(1) fraction of players to participate in the mechanism.
By Theorem 6, the budget required from the analyst isB ≤ n
[
a+
(
αn
γ (4B + 2M) +
γB
γ+(1−ξ) 1
d+2n
+B
)
(b+ 2bB)
]
.
From our choice of a = Θ
(
n−
3
2+δ
)
and because αnγ +
γ
n = o(1), the required budget is B = O
(
n(b+ τα,βǫ
2)
)
=
O
(
n(n−
3
2 + n−
3
2+δ)
)
= O
(
n−
1
2+δ
)
= o(1).
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C Proof of Theorem 7
Theorem 7. Let ξ ∈ (0, 1), and t ≥ 1. Let ‖ · ‖ denote the spectral norm. If {xi}i∈[n] are i.i.d. and sampled uniformly
from the unit ball, then with probability at least 1 − d−t2 , when n ≥ C( tξ )2(d + 2) log d, for some absolute constant
C, then, ∥∥X⊤X∥∥ ≤ (1 + ξ) 1
d+ 2
n, and
∥∥(X⊤X)−1∥∥ ≤ 1
(1− ξ) 1d+2n
, and
∥∥γI +X⊤X∥∥ ≤ γ + (1 + ξ) 1
d+ 2
n, and
∥∥(γI +X⊤X)−1∥∥ ≤ 1
γ + (1− ξ) 1d+2n
.
Proof. We will first require Lemma 11, which characterizes the covariance matrix of the distribution on X .
Lemma 11. The covariance matrix of x is Σ = 1d+2I .
Proof. Let z1, . . . , zd ∼ N(0, 1), and let u ∼ U [0, 1], all drawn independently. Define, r =
√
z21 + · · ·+ z2d and
Z = (u1/d z1r , . . . , u
1/d zd
r ). Then Z describes a uniform distribution over the d-dimensional unit ball [18]. Recall that
this is the same distribution from which the xi are drawn. By the symmetry of the uniform distribution, E[Z] = ~0,
and Cov(Z) must be some scalar times the Identity matrix. Then to compute the covariance matrix of Z , it will
suffice to compute the variance of some coordinate Zi of Z . Since each coordinate of Z has mean 0, then V ar(Zi) =
E[Z2i ] + E[Zi]
2 = E[Z2i ].
d∑
i=1
E[Z2i ] = E
[
d∑
i=1
Z2i
]
= E
[
d∑
i=1
(
u1/d
zi
r
)2]
= E[u2/d]E
[
(
1
r
)2
d∑
i=1
z2i
]
= E[u2/d]
=
d
d+ 2
By symmetry of coordinates, E[Z2i ] = E[Z2j ] for all i, j. Then E[Z2i ] = 1d+2 , and the covariance matrix of Z (and of
the xi since both variables have the same distribution) is Σ = 1d+2I .
From Corollary 5.52 in [25] and the calculation of covariance in Lemma 11, for any ξ ∈ (0, 1) and t ≥ 1, with
probability at least 1− d−t2 , ∥∥∥∥ 1nX⊤X − 1d+ 2I
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ξ 1d+ 2 , (7)
when n ≥ C( tξ )2(d+2) log d, for some absolute constant C. We assume for the remainder of the proof that inequality
(7) holds, which is the case except with probability at most d−t2 , as long as n is sufficiently large. Then∥∥∥∥X⊤X − 1d+ 2nI
∥∥∥∥ ≤ ξ 1d+ 2n.
Let λmax(A) and λmin(A) denote respectively the maximum and minimum eigenvalues of a matrix A. By defini-
tion, λmax(A) = ‖A‖.
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Assume towards a contradiction that λmax(X⊤X) = (1 + ξ) 1d+2n+ δ for δ > 0.
ξ
1
d+ 2
n ≥
∥∥∥∥X⊤X − 1d+ 2nI
∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥X⊤X∥∥− 1
d+ 2
n
= λmax(X
⊤X)− 1
d+ 2
n
= (1 + ξ)
1
d+ 2
n+ δ − 1
d+ 2
n
= ξ
1
d+ 2
n+ δ
This implies δ ≤ 0, which is a contradiction. Thus λmax(X⊤X) = ‖X⊤X‖ ≤ (1 + ξ) 1d+2n.
Similarly, assume that λmin(X⊤X) = (1− ξ) 1d+2n− δ for some δ > 0. Since all eigenvalues are positive, it must
be the case that λmin(X⊤X) ≥ 0.
0 ≥ λmin(X⊤X − 1
d+ 2
nI)
= λmin(X
⊤X)− 1
d+ 2
n
= (1− ξ) 1
d+ 2
n− δ − 1
d+ 2
n
= −ξ 1
d+ 2
n− δ
This is also a contradiction, so λmin(X⊤X) ≥ (1 − ξ) 1d+2n. For any matrix A, λmax(A−1) = 1λmin(A) . Thus,
λmin(X
⊤X) =
1
λmax ((X⊤X)−1)
=
1
‖(X⊤X)−1‖
≥ (1− ξ) 1
d+ 2
n
=⇒ ‖(X⊤X)−1‖ ≤ (1− ξ) 1
d+ 2
n
Using the fact that λ is an eigenvalue of a matrix A if and only if (λ + c) is an eigenvalue of (A + cI), we have
the following inequalities to complete the proof:
∥∥γI +X⊤X∥∥ = λmax(γI +X⊤X) ≤ γ + (1 + ξ) 1
d+ 2
n
∥∥(γI +X⊤X)−1∥∥ = 1
λmin(γI +X⊤X)
≤ 1
γ + (1 − ξ) 1d+2n
D Quadratically Bounded Privacy Penalty Costs
We will consider a particular functional form of fi(ci, ǫ), motivated by the model of privacy cost in the existing
literature [6]. In particular, we assume that each player additionally has a privacy cost function gi that measures her
27
loss for participating in a particular instantiation of a mechanism. Further, we assume that gi is upper-bounded by a
function that depends on the effect that player i’s report has on the mechanism’s output. This assumption leverages the
functional relationship between player i’s data (xi, yi), and the output of the mechanism. For example, if a particular
mechanism ignores the input from player i, then her privacy cost should be 0 for participating in that computation,
since her data is not used. We then define her ex ante privacy cost fi(ci, ǫ) to be her expected cost for participation,
where the expectation is taken over the randomness of other players’ data and reports.
To formally state this assumption, first let mechanism M take in data reports (X, y) and output an estimated
parameter θˆ. Define gi(M, θˆ, (xi, yi), (X−i, y−i)) to be the privacy cost to player i for reporting (xi, yi) to mechanism
M when all other players report (X−i, y−i) and the output of M is θˆ.
Assumption 4 ([6], Privacy Cost Assumption).5 We assume that for any mechanism M that takes in data (X, y) and
outputs an estimate θˆ, then for all players i, for all estimates θˆ, and for all possible input data (X, y),
gi(M, θˆ, (xi, yi), (X−i, y−i)) ≤ ci ln
(
max
y′i,y
′′
i
Pr[M(X, y′i, y−i) = θˆ]
Pr[M(X, y′′i , y−i) = θˆ]
)
.
Lemma 12 ([10, 6], Composition Lemma). In settings that satisfy Assumption 4 and for mechanisms M that are ǫ-
differentially private for ǫ ≤ 1, then for all players i with data (xi, yi), for all data reports of other players (X−i, y−i),
and for all possible misreports y′i by player i,
E[gi(M,M(X, y), (xi, yi), (X−i, y−i))]− E[gi(M,M(X, y′i, y−i), (xi, yi), (X−i, y−i))] ≤ 2ciǫ(eǫ − 1) ≤ 4ciǫ2
Proof. (Sketch) The first inequality comes from Lemma 5.2 of [6] by plugging in our specification of their “privacy-
bound function” and replacing statistical difference with the upper bound of eǫ−1. The second inequality comes from
the bound eǫ ≤ 1 + 2ǫ for small ǫ.
To combine this framework with the utility model introduced in Section 2.4, we need only to interpret fi(ci, ǫ) =
1
4E[gi(M,M(X, y), (xi, yi), (X−i, y−i))]. That is, f(ci, ǫ) is player i’s expected cost for participating in the mecha-
nism (up to a scaling constant). This interpretation, along with Lemma 12, motivates Assumption 1.
E Strong Convexity of Regularized Loss
Recall that we consider the loss functionL(θ,X, y) to be the sum of these individual loss functions plus a regularizing
term:
L(θ;X, y) =
n∑
i=1
ℓ(θ;xi, yi) =
n∑
i=1
(yi − θ⊤xi)2 + γ ‖θ‖22 .
We now define strong convexity, which requires that the eigenvalues of the Hessian of a function are bounded away
from zero, and we prove that the loss function L is strongly convex.
Definition 10 (Strong Convexity). A function f : Rd → R is m-strongly convex if
H (f(χ))−mI is positive semi-definite for all χ ∈ Rd,
where H(f(χ)) is the Hessian6 of f , and I is the d× d identity matrix.
5The assumption proposed in [6] allows privacy costs to be bounded by an arbitrary function of the log probability ratio that satisfies certain
natural properties. We restrict to this particular functional form for simplicity, following [12].
6The Hessian H of function f is a d× d matrix of its partial second derivatives, where
H(f(χ))jk =
∂2f(χ)
∂χj∂χk
.
A d× d matrix A is positive semi-definite (PSD) if for all v ∈ Rd, v⊤Av ≥ 0.
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Notice that when f is a one-dimensional function (d = 1), strong convexity reduces to the requirement that
f ′′(χ) ≥ m > 0 for all χ ∈ R. The following lemma proves that regularizing the quadratic loss L ensures that it is
strongly convex.
Lemma 13. L(θ;X, y) is 2γ-strongly convex in θ.
Proof. We first compute the Hessian of L(θ;X, y). For notational ease, we will suppress the dependence of L on X
and y, and denote the loss function as L(θ). We will use xij to denote the j-th coordinate of xi, and θj to denote the
j-th coordinate of θ.
∂L(θ)
∂θj
=
n∑
i=1
[−2yixij + 2(θ⊤xi)xij]+ 2γθj
∂L(θ)
∂θj∂θk
=
n∑
i=1
[2(xik)xij ] for j 6= k
∂L(θ)
∂θ2j
=
n∑
i=1
[
2(xij)
2
]
+ 2γ
The Hessian of L is,
H(L(θ)) =
n∑
i=1
xix
⊤
i + 2γI,
where I is the identity matrix. Thus,
H(L(θ)) − 2γI =
n∑
i=1
xix
⊤
i ,
which is positive semi-definite. To see this, let v be an arbitrary vector in Rd. Then for each i, v(xix⊤i )v⊤ = (vxi)2 ≥
0. The sum of PSD matrices is also PSD, so L(θ) is 2γ-strongly convex.
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